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This article analyzes and critiques apology laws, their potential use, and effectiveness, both 
legally and ethically, in light of the strong professional norms that shape physicians’ reaction to 
medical errors. Physicians are largely reluctant to disclose medical errors to patients, patients’ 
families, and even other physicians. Some states have passed so-called apology laws in order to 
encourage physicians to disclose medical errors to patients. Apology laws allow defendants to 
exclude statements of sympathy made after accidents from evidence in a liability lawsuit. This 
piece examines potential barriers to physicians’ disclosure of medical mistakes and demonstrates 
how the underlying problem may actually be rooted in professional norms—norms that will 
remain outside the scope of law’s influence. The article also considers other legal and policy 




Since the release of the Institute of Medicine report on medical errors in 2000,2 the 
prevalence of errors in medicine may no longer shock either the public or the medical 
community. But the increased awareness of errors has not been accompanied by better strategies 
to prevent errors or to release them from the shroud of secrecy.3 So-called “apology laws”4 have 
been heralded as the new cure not only for high medical malpractice costs and but also rising 
numbers of malpractice lawsuits.5 Supporters also claim that they will encourage doctors to 
disclose errors to patients. These laws allow defendants to exclude statements of sympathy made 
after accidents from evidence in a liability lawsuit. Over a dozen states, including 
Massachusetts,6 California,7 Florida,8 and Texas,9 have passed apology laws.10 
Critics of apology laws, most notably Lee Taft, are concerned that the sympathetic 
statements that apology laws protect may become empty, utilitarian or self-serving rituals, 
                                                 
2 INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000) 
[hereinafter IOM REPORT] (concluding that between 44,000 and 98,000 patients die every year in hospitals as a 
result of medical error which, using the lower estimate, is more than from automobile accidents, breast cancer or 
AIDS). 
3 See generally Maxine M. Harrington, Revisiting Medical Error: Five years after the IOM Report, Have Reporting 
Systems Made Measurable Difference?, 15 HEALTH MATRIX 329 (2005) (discussing the problem of underreporting). 
4 See generally Jonathan R. Cohen, Legislating Apology: The Pros and Cons, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 819 (2002); 
Jonathan R. Cohen, Apology and Organizations: Exploring an Example from Medical Practice, 27 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 1447 (2000); Carol B. Liebman & Chris Stern Hyman, Medical Error Disclosure, Mediation Skills, and 
Malpractice Litigation 31-56 (2005), available at http://www.medliabilitypa.org (discussing disclosure and apology 
policies in health care systems and recommending consult service for communication experts). For a discussion on 
use of apologies in criminal law, see Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology 
into Criminal Procedure,  114 YALE L.J. 85 (2004).  
5 See Rachel Zimmerman, Medical Contrition: Doctors’ New Tool to Fight Lawsuits: Say “I’m sorry”, WALL ST. J., 
May 18, 2004, at A1. One of the leading groups championing these apology laws is the Sorry Works! Coalition. See 
Sorry Works! Coalition, http://www.sorryworks.net (last visited May 16, 2006). The Sorry Works! protocol/full-
disclosure approach was developed in the 1980s and implemented at the Veterans Administration Hospital in 
Lexington, Kentucky. The VA system has since adopted a similar approach nation-wide. Department of Veterans 
Affairs, Disclosure of Adverse Events to Patients, VHA Directive 2005-049, October 27, 2005, available at 
http://www1.va.gov/vhaethics/download/AEPolicy.pdf. 
6 MASS. GEN. LAWS CH. 233, Sec 23D. 
7 CAL. EVID. CODE 1160 (Supp 2004). 
8 FLA. STAT. ANN. CH. 90.4026 (Supp 2004). 
9 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 18.061 (Supp 2004-05). 
10 Liebman & Hyman, supra note 4, at app. A. 
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leading doctors away from the higher moral purposes of apologies.11 Taft makes a normative 
observation, and my study does not focus on this aspect. Instead, I question whether the apology 
system would successfully encourage apologies, given the deeply entrenched attitudes and 
behaviors of doctors toward disclosure. I argue that the more pressing problem in medicine is not 
simply the lack of apologies, but a more fundamental lack of disclosure. A narrow evidentiary 
rule like the apology laws will do little to change the silence that surrounds mistakes in medicine. 
I point to barriers embedded in long-standing professional norms and traditions of the physician-
patient relationship. 
II. Apology Laws 
 In 1986, Massachusetts enacted a statute excluding from admissibility expressions of 
sympathy and benevolence after accidents. The safe harbor provision for apologizers in the 
Massachusetts statute provides: 
Statements, writings, or benevolent gestures expressing sympathy or a general sense of 
benevolence relating to the pain, suffering or death of a person involved in an accident 
and made to such person or to the family of such person shall be inadmissible as evidence 
of an admission of liability in a civil action.12 
 
In 1999, Texas passed a similar “I’m sorry” law that protects statements of regret, but does not 
protect “a statement . . . concerning negligence or culpable conduct . . . .”13 This statute became 
                                                 
11 Lee Taft, Apology Within a Moral Dialectic: A Reply to Professor Robbennolt, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1011 (2005). 
First, a sympathetic statement devoid of the admission of fault or the acceptance of responsibility may not be an 
apology at all. Such sympathetic statements have been deemed “partial apolog[ies],” which lack the moral 
dimension and power of true repentance. Id. Just saying “I’m sorry” does not acknowledge grievances, accept 
responsibility for causing them, or express remorse. AARON LAZARE, ON APOLOGY 25 (2004). These statements 
could leave patients even more frustrated, perhaps even more so when they find out that they cannot use the 
statements as evidence in court. Since the apology laws exclude evidence of the apology statement for use to prove 
liability, one might argue that patients would be more angered that although they suspect that a mistake occurred, 
but that they can’t use a statement of apology as evidence against the doctor. For a discussion of the importance of 
trust in looking at malpractice reform proposals, see Mark A. Hall, Can You Trust a Doctor You Can’t Sue?, 54 
DEPAUL L. REV. 303 (2005). The statutes are limited in second way: Sympathy and remorse are easily feigned. One 
of the reasons is that remorse is an emotion that takes place “mostly on the inside, the biting and biting again of 
conscience.” WILLIAM IAN MILLER, FAKING IT, 78 (2003). 
12 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 233 § 23D (2000). 
13 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 18.061 (Supp. 2004-05). 
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the model for other states. These apology laws, with the exception of Colorado,14 do not exclude 
from admissibility full admissions of fault by the doctor.15 
A. Role of Apologies and Disclosure in Malpractice 
One might wonder why physicians should be worried about expressing sympathy in the 
first place. Apologies have been admitted as evidence against physicians in subsequent civil suits 
of malpractice in various forms. Prior out-of-court statements of the defendant physicians can be 
used against the defendant as a way of providing expert testimony that establishes a prima facie 
case of malpractice. In medical malpractice cases, the plaintiff must demonstrate (1) the 
applicable standard of care; (2) a breach of that standard of care; (3) an injury; and (4) proximate 
cause between the breach of duty and injury. In most cases, the plaintiffs must use expert 
testimony from members of the defendant’s profession in order to establish the standard of care 
and its breach. Expert testimony does not have to come from third-party experts. Plaintiffs can 
establish a prima facie case with statements made by the defendant physicians. Thus, the 
presence of an apology in a case might make the case more likely to go to trial and may 
influence the strength of the plaintiff’s case or the defense’s willingness to settle.16 
                                                 
14 Edward A. Dauer, Apology in the Aftermath of Injury: Colorado’s “I’m Sorry” Law, 34 COLO. LAW. 47 (2005). 
15 Oregon enacted a similar statute in 2003, excluding a licensed medical professional’s statement of “apology or 
regret” but does not further define the terms. Oreg. Rev. Stat. § 677.082 (2003). 
16 Danzon and Lillard report that 50% of cases were settled prior to filing a legal suit. Most studies have found that 
about 40% of claims filed were dropped without payment, 50% settled out of court by payment to plaintiff, and 7-
10% litigated to verdict. See PATRICIA MUNCH DANZON & LEE A. LILLARD, THE RESOLUTION OF MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE CLAIMS, 43 (1982). Studies have found that 36% of cases were dropped by the plaintiffs or dismissed 
by the judge, and 58% settled out of court, and only 5.2% were tried in court. Cases fit into a pattern of three 
categories: “[c]ases with low defendant liability are likely to be dropped, those with high defendant liability are 
more likely to be settled, and a more mixed pattern is apparent for the cases decided at verdict and beyond.” NEIL 
VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY 37-45 (1995). Danzon and Lillard make a similar 
observation in their model, asserting that cases only continue to verdict where plaintiff either overestimates the 
award or the defendant underestimates the award or probability of losing. Thus, the following cases represent a 
narrow selection of cases that were not settled before the court was asked to determine whether the case was 
sufficient for submission to the jury. However, such cases are important because they set the precedent and guide 
future settlement decisions of both parties. 
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However, the legal liability of apologies can cut the other way. First, a physician who has 
apologized is a much more sympathetic defendant. If the case does go before a jury, then the jury 
may be less likely to award higher damages compared to a physician who appears cold and 
unapologetic. In fact, Dr. Lucian Leape, a leading physician-figure in the discussion of medical 
errors, encourages disclosure and apologies precisely for this reason: 
The long, painful, shameful spectacle of the plaintiff lawyer trying to prove in public that 
the physician is negligent, a bad person, will not take place. The court’s role will be 
limited to establishing just compensation. What is a jury likely to do with a physician 
who has been honest and also apologized? Judgments will most likely be far less costly.17 
 
Second, the caselaw on whether physicians’ statements to patients are actually admitted as 
admissions of fault varies widely. Physician statements have been held as evidence for an 
extrajudicial admission that establishes both the standard of care and its breach in some cases.18 
Many of these cases include statements, as recalled by the plaintiff, that sound callous and 
insensitive.19 But even well-intentioned and remorseful doctors have had their statements used 
against them in a later malpractice suit. In Woronka, the plaintiff filed suit for burns she received 
on her buttocks while giving birth.20 The defendant doctor examined the patient two days later 
                                                 
17 Lucian L. Leape, Understanding the Power of Apology: How Saying "I'm Sorry" Helps Heal Patients and 
Caregivers, 8 NAT’L PATIENT SAFETY FOUNDATION NEWSL. 3 (2005). 
18 Colbert v. Georgetown Univ., 623 A.2d 1244 (1993) (holding that defendant physician’s admission that he had 
made a mistake in not performing a mastectomy 2 months earlier and that he had performed the wrong operation 
established a breach in the standard of care); Robertson v. LaCroix, 534 P.2d 17, 19 (Okla. App. 1975) (holding that 
physician’s statement that he “just made a mistake and got over too far” during surgery was prima facie evidence of 
the standard of care and its breach); Sheffield v. Runner, 328 P.2d. 828 (1958) (finding that the case was sufficient 
to submit to the jury based on statements by defendant physician indicating that the patient should have been treated 
in the hospital and that “I should have put her in the hospital”); Snyder v. Pantaleo, 122 A.2d 21 (1956) (holding that 
defendant radiologist’s statement to the deceased’s family physician that the patient had a reaction when the 
defendant gave her an injection of the iodine compound, yet injected her with an iodine compound, was expert 
testimony of the standard of care and its breach); Lashley v. Koerber, 156 P.2d 441 (1945) (finding that the jury 
could reasonable conclude that the admissions of the defendant doctor’s alleged statement to patient that “I know it 
is not your fault, . . . it is all my own” constituted breach of the standard of care). 
19 Wickoff v. James, 324 P.2d 661, 667 (1958) (finding that defendant doctor’s admission to the patient’s husband 
“Boy, I sure made a mess out of things today, didn’t I Warren” and “I busted the intestine” established a prima facie 
case of negligence); Zettler v. Reich, 11 N.Y.S.2d 85 (1939) (holding that dentist’s statement “Well , I did break 
your jaw, I guess I hit you a little too hard,” in addition to an outcome unlikely in absence of negligence, was 
sufficient to establish prima facie case). 
20 Woronka v. Sewall, 69 N.E.2d (Mass 1946). 
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and allegedly said, “My God, what a mess; my God, what happened here . . . . It is a darn shame 
to have this happen” and sympathized with the patient for a “very hard delivery and it was a 
burning shame to get that on top of it, and it was because of negligence when they were 
upstairs.”21 The doctor explained to the husband that the event should not have happened—and 
that the staff was going to do something to correct the problem. The court found that these 
statements were sufficient to present the case to the jury. In Greenwood,22 the physician 
apologized and explained that he had wrongly diagnosed a tumor when the patient was actually 
pregnant. The doctor had accidentally aborted a fetus. The patient’s husband recalled that the 
physician said, “this is a terrible thing I have done, I wasn’t satisfied with the lab report, she did 
have signs of being pregnant. I should have had tests run again, I should have made some other 
tests” and “I’m sorry.”23 The court found that these statements indicated a prima facie case of 
malpractice. 
But equally as many other courts have found that apologies are insufficient evidence to 
establish the standard of care or its breach.24 One court found that one physician’s statement that 
“I’m sorry, I accidentally cut the nerve to your vocal cord” was not enough to establish failure of 
due care.25 In Senesac, the court found that the physician’s alleged admission that she “made a 
mistake, that she was sorry, and that it has never happened before,” was insufficient to establish 
the standard of care or its breach.26 Even when physicians describe adverse events as “mistakes” 
or “inadvertent,” many courts have held that such out-of-court statements are not enough to 
                                                 
21 69 N.E.2d 581, 582. 
22 Greenwood v. Harris, 362 P.2d 85 (1961). 
23 Page number 
24 See e.g., Phinney v. Vinson, 605 A.2d 849 (1992) (holding that physician who allegedly admitted that he 
performed an “inadequate resection” and apologized was not enough for the plaintiff to meet its burden of proof); 
Jeffries v. Murdock, 74 Or. App. 38 (1985); Senesac v. Associates in Obstetrics & Gynecology 449 A.3d 900 
(1982). 
25 Jeffries v. Murdock, 74 Or. App. 38 (1985). 
26 Senesac v. Associates in Obstetrics & Gynecology 449 A.3d  900 (1982). 
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establish a prima facie case.27 Therefore, the caselaw on the legal liability of apologies is not 
uniform or clear. 
Apology laws have the potential to make this caselaw more uniform by not allowing any 
apologies to be admitted into evidence. The idea is that this should reassure physicians and allow 
them to feel safer in apologizing to patients. But to follow that logic is to ignore the much deeper 
problem—that the kind of apologies that these laws seek to protect are ones that are given in the 
context of adverse events and medical errors. It would be silly to think that apology laws are 
necessary to enable doctors to deliver harmless empathetic statements in the everyday situation; 
physicians frequently and without hesitation can say to their patients that they are sorry that their 
patients are experiencing pain or suffering. These are not scenarios to which the apology laws are 
concerned. Apology laws are supposed to help doctors speak up when medical errors occur—to 
push doctors to engage in apologies as part of disclosure. In this way, apology laws do not tackle 
the more fundamental issue that physicians struggle with apologies as part of disclosure of 
medical errors. 
                                                 
27 Maxwell v. Women’s Clinic, P.A. 625 P2d 407 (1981) (holding that defendant’s statement that he “obviously 
messed up” was insufficient to establish breach of standard of care); Crowley v. O’Neil, 609 P.2d 198 (holding that 
defendant doctor’s use of the word “accident” did not establish negligence); Locke v. Pachtman, 446 Mich. 216 
(1994) (holding that physician’s statement that she chose a needle “too small” does not establish prima facie case); 
Collins v. Itoh, 503 P.2d 36 (1972) (holding that defendant doctor’s admission that he removed a parathyroid gland 
by mistake was insufficient to establish prima facie case for plaintiff); Sutton v. Calhoun, 593 F.2d 127 (1979) 
(holding that defendant doctor’s alleged statement during a conversation with the patient’s family after surgery that 
he made a “mistake” was not an admission of negligence); Smith v. Karen S. Reisig, M.D., Inc., 686 P.2d 285 
(1984) (holding that defendant doctor’s statement in the medical record that injury to plaintiff’s bladder was 
“inadvertent” was not an admission of negligence); Quickstad v. Tavenner 264 N.W. 436 (1936) (holding that 
alleged admissions of defendant doctor that “he broke the needle,” that he “should have used a stronger needle,” that 
he “shouldn’t have done it” and “would never try it again” were not enough to support a prima facie case for the 
plaintiff). 
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B. Definitions and Approaches to Error 
Errors28 can be defined along at least three different dimensions: 1) the severity or gravity 
of the consequence, ranging from no harm to reversible harm to serious irreversible injury, and 
finally death; 2) potential versus actual harm (a near miss versus actual injury); and 3) the level 
of agency and control, and, as a corollary, the level of avoidability. The problem of uncertainty 
and the complicated system of healthcare delivery makes it difficult for parties to agree where to 
place certain events along these different dimensions. Commentators on medical errors are also 
divided between two models of error: the persons and systems approach.29 The “persons 
approach” locates the problem of error to the individual level. In contrast, the “systemic 
approach” focuses on errors as a result of system failures.30  
Defining error and choosing an approach to error are hidden battlegrounds for different 
institutional interests. The medical community and advocates of the patient safety movement 
advance the systemic approach. They avoid placing individual blame on physicians and other 
health care professionals. The Institute of Medicine, stresses that “[t]he problem is not bad 
                                                 
28 An “adverse event,” which involves actual harm, is an overlapping category with “medical error”. An adverse 
event (also sometimes referred to as “harm”, “injury”, or “complication”) is “[a]n injury that was caused by medical 
management rather than the patient’s underlying disease.” Medical management includes both actor and non-actors. 
Janet Barnes et al., When Things Go Wrong: Responding to Adverse Events, 4 (2006) (introducing a consensus 
statement of the Harvard Hospitals); IOM REPORT, supra note 2, at 29. Some adverse events may be the result of 
error, some not. Medical errors, according to the Harvard Hospital statement, are the “failure of a planned action to 
be completed as intended or the use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim.”  The definition of medical error includes 
events that are potential and actual harm, at various levels of severity: (1) serious error (“[a]n error that has the 
potential to cause permanent injury or transient but potentially life-threatening harm”); (2) minor error (“[a]n error 
that does not cause harm or have the potential to do so”); and (3) near miss (“[a]n error that could have caused harm 
but did not reach the patient because it was intercepted”). Barnes et al., supra note 28, at 4 (borrowing from the 
definitions from the American Society of Healthcare Risk Management). In contrast, other authors have defined 
medical errors limited to events that have caused serious harm. See Robert J. Blendon et al., Views of Practicing 
Physicians and the Public on Medical Errors, 347 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 1933, 1934 (2002) (defining medical error as 
“mistakes . . . made that result in serious harm, such as death, disability, or additional or prolonged treatment.”). 
29 James Reason, Human Error: Models and Management, 320 BRITISH MED. J. 768 (2000) (discussing the 




people; the problem is that the system needs to be safer.”31 The Harvard Hospital consensus 
statement is more balanced and distinguishes three types of error: error by attending physician, 
error by others on the healthcare team, and systems failure with no individual error.32 
Physicians themselves understand and categorize errors differently than policymakers, 
legislators, or lawyers might. Charles Bosk, a sociologist who studied surgeons in major 
hospitals, described how surgeons saw errors as technical, judgmental, and normative errors, 
with a separate category of exogenous sources of failure.33 Technical errors occur when a 
physician performs his role carefully but his skill is inadequate. Judgmental errors are when the 
wrong course of treatment is chosen. Normative errors, which Bosk notes are the least acceptable 
to physicians, occur when the physician has failed to been conscientious about her obligations of 
the role as a physician other than treatment and care. Some examples of normative errors are: not 
calling an attending physician when their patient is in a precarious or serious situation, failing to 
treat fellow physicians or nursing staff politely, or failing to be honest with his colleagues or 
superiors. One attending explained, “the most important thing is complete intellectual honesty, a 
willingness to admit problems and personal deficiencies. Someone who recognizes his errors and 
‘fesses up.’ Look I could teach a gorilla to operate in six months, but I can’t teach honesty and 
responsibility. It’s the people who have these qualities that make outstanding surgeons.” 34 
The lack of consensus on the definition of error, and what constitutes reportable error, 
frustrates many parties: physicians who must figure out when to report, hospital administrators, 
and policymakers who try to enact effective, consistent reporting systems.35 
                                                 
31 IOM REPORT, supra note 2, at 49. 
32 Janet Barnes et al., supra note 28, at 4. 
33 CHARLES L. BOSK, FORGIVE AND REMEMBER 37-70 (1979) (describing the different types of errors among 
surgeons). 
34 Id. at 60. 
35 Janet Barnes et al., supra note 28, at 4 (noting the confusion surrounding terms referring to bad outcomes). 
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C. Groups in Favor of Disclosure 
Apology laws therefore must be considered within the broader conversation of disclosure 
of medical errors. The problem of medical errors and the question of disclosure have been 
approached in many different ways. Commentators on medical errors have identified “a deep-
seated tension”36 between the two worldviews: malpractice law37 and the patient safety 
movement.38 I suggest a third perspective, which Bibas and Bierschbach call the “relational 
approach.”39 This section points out that those who have a stake in all three perspectives have a 
strong interest in encouraging disclosure. But none of them have been successful in getting 
doctors to disclose. 
1. Tort Law Approach 
Tort law has different goals, depending on one’s underlying theory. Advocates of the 
economic analysis of tort law40 assert that liability rules are justified by their promotion of 
efficiency, whether in the form of deterrence or insurance.41 In contrast, others argue that the best 
account of tort law is one of corrective justice42 and that “those who are responsible for the 
wrongful losses of other have a duty to repair them.”43 Medical malpractice therefore seeks: 1) to 
promote economic efficiency; 2) to deter negligence by doctors; 3) to compensate patients 
injured by negligence; and 4) to enforce an ideal of justice. 
                                                 
36 David Studdert et al., Medical Malpractice, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 283, 287 (2004). 
37 Studdert et al., supra note 36 (describing malpractice law as a “punitive, individualistic, adversarial approach”) 
38 Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Paths to Reducing Medical Injury: professional Liability and Discipline vs. Patient 
Safety—and the Need for a Third Way, 29 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 369, 369-71 (2001). 
39 Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal Procedure,  114 
YALE L.J. 85, 89 (2004). 
40 WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987); STEVEN SHAVELL, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987). 
41 Jules L. Coleman, The Structure of Tort Law, 97 YALE L.J. 1233, 1235-36 (1988). 
42 Jules Coleman, Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limits, 2 LAW & PHIL. 5 (1983).; Richard Epstein, A 
Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973); George Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 
HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972); Ernest Weinrib, Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2 LAW & PHIL. 37 (1983). 
43 Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 15, 15 (1995) 
13 
Supporters of the tort law system have a significant interest in pushing for disclosure. 
Many patients will not be aware that they deserve compensation unless a physician alerts them to 
the fact that a medical error has occurred. The lack of disclosure will result in less just and 
efficient system: Fewer injured patients will receive compensation and fewer physicians will be 
deterred. But critics of this approach often doubt the effectiveness of legal deterrence in 
medicine. They also point out that physicians will only be less likely to disclose if they must face 
punitive consequences. There is evidence that both supports and denies a deterrent effect 
compared to other nonpunitive measures.44   
2. Patient Safety Approach 
Patient safety advocates promote disclosure as fundamental to the detection of error and 
prevention of future errors. The overarching goal of the patient safety perspective is to prevent 
iatrogenic injury, or injuries caused by medical management, and reduce errors through systemic 
changes.45 Patient safety advocates push for transparency through reporting requirements and 
voluntary, anonymous, and confidential reporting systems. But even these nonpunitive reporting 
systems have not been very successful at getting doctors to disclose.46 
Other patient safety advocates urge physicians to disclose to patients.47 But this plea has 
been largely ineffective. One reason may be that the malpractice system is in place. But another 
part of the problem is that, in contrast to reporting systems, the connection between disclosure to 
patients and the basic patient safety goal of reducing future errors is unclear. In other words, it 
                                                 
44 Bovjberg et al., supra note 38, at nn.16 & 21. 
45 For a history of the development of the patient safety movement, see Michelle M. Mello et al., Fostering Rational 
Regulation of Patient Safety, 30 J. OF HEALTH POLITICS, POL’Y & L. 375 (2005). 
46 See Maxine M. Harrington, Revisiting Medical Error: Five Years After the IOM Report, Have Reporting Systems 
Made  Measurable Difference?, 15 Health Matrix 329, 366 (2005) (“[m]ost experts believe that the low incidence of 
reporting is due not to a tremendous decrease in adverse incidents or medical errors, but to widespread 
underreporting). 
47 See e.g Dale Ann Micalizzi, Advocate for Pediatric Patient Safety & Transparency in Medicine, presentation “A 
Mother’s Journey Through a Health Care System that was Meant to Comfort and Heal.” (on file with author). 
14 
does not make sense to ask a physician to disclose to the patient for purely patient safety goals. 
There is no evidence that shows that a physician who has disclosed to the patient is any less 
likely to repeat the error, or that patients after disclosure are better able to avoid medical errors in 
the future.48  Therefore, patient safety advocates risk sending physicians mixed messages when 
asking physicians to disclose to patients. 
3. Relational Approach 
Finally, the desire for disclosure and apology is important from a third perspective: to 
protect and improve the physician-patient relationship. Disclosure can both preserve trust and 
compassion in the doctor-patient relationship as an ethical ideal in itself and help maintain a 
good relationship in order for the patient and doctor to heal after an adverse event. Bibas and 
Bierschbach describe the importance of the relational approach in the criminal context: 
Remorse and apology are fundamentally about social interactions and relationships. 
Serious wrongdoers sometimes apologize not only to the direct victim, but also to 
everyone who suffered indirect harm, such as members of the victim's family and 
community. Victims, in return, can air their sorrows while expressing forgiveness to the 
wrongdoer. Ideally, this interactive process teaches moral lessons, brings catharsis, and 
reconciles and heals offenders, victims, and society.49 
 
Despite the ethical appeal of this perspective, advocates of the relational approach and 
even the physicians who subscribe to this approach will experience resistance from physicians. 
One of the founders of the apology and full disclosure movement, Steve Kraman and Richard 
Boothman, have admitted that emphasizing apologies without grounding it in other “hard-edged” 
justifications makes disclosure seem “too touchy-feely and self righteous.”50 Calling for 
                                                 
48 Patient safety advocates could argue that disclosing errors to patients makes more information available to 
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disclosure without providing incentives other than the satisfaction acting morally will likely fall 
upon deaf ears. Kraman and Boothman admit that “[a] constant litany of “doing the right thing” 
won’t persuade the doubters.”51 
D. The Political Economy 
The problem of disclosure and how to encourage disclosure is at the center of all three 
approaches. I suggest that one fundamental cause of the difficulty and slowness to encouraging 
disclosure may be that the process has been “determined by the efforts of individuals and groups 
to further their own interests.”52 As a result of many players at the table with different interests, 
the movement toward reducing error and encouraging disclosure has been both incremental and 
largely ineffective.53 
Different parties blame others, declaring that each is disadvantaged by the political 
process compared to the other groups. Take, for example, the debate over the tort reform 
approach to medical error. Groups with defense interests, like physicians and hospitals, point out 
that state legislators and judges are swayed by plaintiffs’ lawyer contributions. They assert that 
well-organized trial bar associations like the American Trial Lawyers’ Association stymie efforts 
for reform.54 One commentator claimed that the “trial bar, a powerful constituency in the 
Democratic party” and is “focused on scuttling [malpractice] reform and . . . expected to resist 
vigorously any attempt to introduce radical changes in the system.”55 
In contrast, plaintiff’s groups suggest that patients are a diffuse group of consumers who 
                                                 
51 Id. 
52 Gary Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371, 371 
(1983). 
53 See Maxine M. Harrington, Revisiting Medical Error: Five years after the IOM Report, Have Reporting Systems 
Made  Measurable Difference?, 15 Health Matrix 329, 366 (2005) (“[m]ost experts believe that the low incidence of 
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54 John Fabian Witt, Lessons from History: State Constitutions, American Tort Law, and the Medical Malpractice 
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need strong representation. The trial bar argues that they need to counter the powerful 
organizations that represent hospitals, manufacturers, physicians, and insurance companies. 
Indeed, the patient safety movement is backed by “institutions and associations rather than a 
grass-roots response.”56 
In fact, no one stakeholder has been able to dominate the discussion of medical errors or 
issues like tort reform.57 The political economy helps to explain why progress has been slow and 
frustrating. But all three approaches have pushed for disclosure. They have relied on their own 
methods: used the threat of malpractice, coaxed physicians with nonpunitive reporting systems, 
or even stressed the moral goodness of disclosure. These methods may be in conflict with each 
other, which have contributed to the overall ineffectiveness. But it is not only this conflict that 
has stymied the movement to disclosure. All three approaches have encountered a strong, 
underlying resistance to disclosure by physicians. 
III. Principles v. Practice: The Rule of Silence 
A. Disclosure to Patients 
In January 2002, Dr. Alan Kliger, the chairman of the Department of Medicine at the 
Hospital of St. Raphael in New Haven, faced a physician’s worst nightmare. Two patients died—
both deaths were determined accidental. Two women had been given nitrous oxide instead of 
oxygen during a cardiac catheterization. The hospital contacted the families to disclose the error 
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and apologize.58 Dr. Kliger recounts that speaking with the family was “one of the hardest things 
that I have ever done in my life.”59 
A subsequent analysis revealed that a series of events had gone wrong: a faulty oxygen 
flowmeter, over a dozen systemic failures, and human error. Although the literature of medical 
errors and patient safety emphasizes the focus on errors as systemic failures and not individual 
mistakes,60 the public (patients, families, or the media) naturally wants to hold individuals 
accountable.61 It particularly does not ease the immense emotional burden on patients or the 
family of patients. Thus, when a physician must face the patient or family, the job remains 
enormously difficult. 
One must not overlook the importance of the interaction between the individual physician 
and patient. The disclosure of adverse events is distinctly an “individual moment.”62 This Part 
focuses on the “individual moment” of disclosure of adverse events in the physician-patient 
relationship. Several considerations are at play. The physician might feel great duty and 
responsibility to the patient and the need to explain the situation or to convey his remorse 
regarding errors. The physician might even want to admit error—to confess—as a way of asking 
for absolution of her guilt.63 On the other hand, the physician might be much more cautious and 
reluctant to speak about error, given greater fears of liability. The physician might also be 
concerned about long-term repercussions of revealing error. She may be concerned about her 
reputation, losing the respect of her peers or colleagues, or disciplinary action from her seniors or 
                                                 
58 Robert F. Worth, Hospital Says Two Died in Nitrous Oxide Mistake, N.Y. TIMES, January 17, 2002, at B. 
59 Alan Kliger, Presentation at Yale School of Medicine, March 13, 2006. 
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the hospital. It can be also extremely psychologically difficult to face the person whom she has 
harmed or put at risk, someone who might react to her with anger or loss of trust. There are also 
pressures exerted on the physician’s decision external to the physician-patient relationship—
particularly the recommendations of hospital lawyers, risk managers, and administration. It is not 
clear a priori how this complex set of considerations would affect the disclosure of errors of 
physicians to patients. 
The public, however, is largely unanimous on wanting disclosure. The public expects 
physicians to be honest, open, and forthcoming. Patients generally desire (in order of diminishing 
unanimity): 1) a clear statement that an error has occurred; 2) an explanation of the full detail of 
the error; 3) a sincere apology; 4) reassurances that the something is being done to make sure the 
error does not happen again; and 5) financial compensation for injury, pain or suffering; and 6) 
accountability on the part of the responsible physician.64 
Patients have an overwhelming consensus in their desire to be informed of details of what 
happened, even for trivial errors: 98-99% of patients favor disclosure.65 A smaller majority of 
patients believe that near misses should be disclosed.66 Patients largely want to know the full 
details of the error.67 But disclosure of facts is insufficient. One study found that 88% of patients 
wanted the doctor to apologize and 99% wanted to know that something was being done to 
prevent the error from occurring again. Many wanted financial compensation for injury as well.68 
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In principle, at least, physicians are on the side of the patients in this matter:  Between 
70-90% of physicians agree that doctors should disclose medical errors to patients.69 Individual 
physicians have stated that “[t]he bottom line is that physicians have an obligation to disclose to 
their patients clear-cut mistakes that cause significant harm.”70 But far fewer believe trivial harm 
or near misses should be disclosed.71 
The ethical standards of physicians reflect this narrow principle of disclosure. The 
American Medical Association (AMA) Code of Ethics requires disclosure when “a patient 
suffers significant medical complications that may have resulted from the physician’s mistake or 
judgment.”72 The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations (JCAHO) 
requires that patients must be informed of any “unanticipated” outcomes that significantly differ 
from their expected outcome.73  The American College of Physicians (ACP) Ethics Manual 
states that physicians should tell patients about “procedural or judgment errors” if such 
information is “material to the patient's well-being.”74 
These standards lack adequate specificity, are ill-suited to the complex nature of errors, 
and are narrow in scope. JCAHO standards have left physicians confused as to what counts as 
“unanticipated.”75 The ACP Ethics Manual, co-authored by two attorneys, does not define 
materiality (which is a legal, and not medical term), and the AMA Code of Ethics is silent on 
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how to determine whether a complication is “significant.” Also, the standards do not tackle 
common, but complex, questions: How much physician contribution to an error creates the duty 
to disclose? Is a physician obligated to disclose a systems error? What are the obligations of a 
physician who witnesses a colleague’s harmful error? 
Furthermore, these codes do not state who should report the error to the patient or family. 
On the one hand, the openness of the codes lends flexibility. On the other hand, the lack of 
assignment of the difficult task of disclosure can lend to passing of responsibility from person to 
person. Both physicians and the public significantly agree that a physician should disclose the 
error to the patient, more so than the hospital or nurse involved.76 However, interestingly, 
another study suggests that as the severity of the mistake increases, the desire of the patient to 
speak to the erring physician drops: Only half of patients would like to speak about the physician 
who made a severe mistake, whereas their desire to speak to another physician about the mistake 
increases.77 This study suggests that the appropriateness of the responsible physician to speak 
directly with the patient may depend on the severity of the error. Should the physician who has 
committed a severe mistake speak to the patient directly? Should the erring physician provide 
other physicians or administrators to whom the patient may feel more comfortable speaking 
about the error? The ethical codes do not help to answer these questions. 
Moreover, these standards require only disclosure of facts. The Code of Ethics requires 
the physician “to inform the patient of all the facts necessary.”78 The Veterans Health 
Administration Directive defines disclosure as a “discussion of clinically significant facts.”79 All 
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standards are silent on the whether the physician should issue an apology, expression of regret or 
remorse, assumption of responsibility, or even reassurance that there are changes in place to 
prevent future errors. One suspects, particularly given patient expectations, that the duty to 
disclose and responsibility to one’s patient include much more than a factual release—that 
physicians have an obligation to repair the broken trust in some deeper way. One wonders 
whether these guidelines recommend an “ethical” disclosure after all. 
Physicians fail to meet even their own ethical standards and disappoint patient 
expectations on all fronts. Only about a quarter of physicians actually disclose medical errors. In 
a study of physicians-in-training, only 24% discussed the mistake with the patient or the patient’s 
family.80 Of note, these rates of disclosure may not be entirely accurate since it has been shown 
that attitudes toward disclosure significantly differ based on level of experience: Those who are 
more experienced have less trouble and are and less reluctant to disclosing errors.81 Some 
subsequent studies of experienced physicians have corroborated the low rates of disclosure to 
patients.82 Nationwide studies suggest that physicians in only about 30% of cases disclose 
errors.83 
The disconnect between physicians and patients reaches deeper, disturbing levels. 
Disclosure is not only uncommon, but also the content and form of disclosure can vary widely—
often both failing the expectations of patients and falling short of clear disclosure. The language 
of disclosure to patients avoids blame or responsibility, and sometimes does not suggest a 
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problem at all.84 In a study of physicians disclosing clear-cut, harmful errors to standardized 
patients, surgeons described clear, harmful errors to patients using “error” or “mistake” in 57% 
of cases, “complication” or “problem” in 27% of cases, and did not suggest the error at all in 
16% of cases.85 Physicians admit that they choose their words carefully, some consciously 
protect themselves and other rationalize that it is to “protect” the patient. One physician 
explained: 
I think you have to be a spin doctor all the time and put the right spin on it. . . . I don’t 
think you have to soft pedal the issue, but I think you try to put it in the best light. I think 
you have to be forthright with the patient to help them. And how you word it makes a big 
difference.86 
 
Physicians do not often take responsibility or apologize with empathy. Only 21% of physicians 
apologized after they made a harmful mistake.87  In fact, some doctors believe that to admit a 
mistake or say that they were affected emotionally is unprofessional.88 
Even when physicians eventually disclosed the error, they did so only after patients press 
them for further details about the incident.89 This response directly conflicts with what patients 
want: a forthcoming and honest physician, rather than having to be the one to ask the doctor and 
search for answers. Patients and family members sense that their physicians are being 
unforthcoming and protective,90 and feel alone and frustrated—both emotions that are commonly 
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experienced by patients after injurious errors.91 The breakdown of the physician-patient 
relationship quickly ensues. 
B. Disclosure Among Physicians 
One might expect that physicians have a much harder time telling a patient that they have 
made a mistake compared to explaining it to another physician. Other physicians might be more 
understanding and would be less likely to react with anger or retaliation. The morbidity and 
mortality (M & M) conferences are places where physicians can conduct such peer review and 
self-regulation. But these conferences illustrate that even a legally protected forum cannot 
successfully encourage physicians to speak about errors openly and transparently. 
There are substantial safeguards in place to protect proceedings and statements in M & M 
conferences from discovery and admission in malpractice cases. This has not encouraged 
admission of error or disclosure in these forums as successfully as one might expect. Despite 
protections of the confidentiality of such forums in both federal and state courts, physicians 
remain reluctant to discuss their mistakes or errors. This example suggests that legal liability 
does not constrain the discussion of error as much as perhaps other factors, such as the social 
norms of medicine. It also shows that evidentiary protections meant to promote candor and self-
improvement do not necessary make it much easier to physicians to talk about their own errors. 
This provides grounds to question the potential effectiveness of apology laws. 
Physicians have historically resisted public acknowledgement of medical errors to the 
public, even to other physicians. The tradition of M & M conferences has been commonly traced 
to Ernest Codman, a surgeon at Massachusetts General Hospital between 1911 and 1917.92 
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Codman wanted to standardize care and devised an “End Result System” that documented each 
patient’s diagnosis, outcome, treatment plan, and any complications from treatment.93 He pressed 
for the publication of these results and for transparency among colleagues and even to the public. 
Codman urged hospitals to review cases in which errors may have occurred. Codman’s effort 
toward reform was met with resistance by his colleagues. He later established his own private 
hospital and published the results of his End Result System.94 He called for public hospitals to do 
the same, to no avail.95 
It was not until 1935 that a formal group was created to review and share information 
about adverse outcomes: the Anesthesia Mortality Committee in Philadelphia. The meetings 
served to educate physicians and to improve the quality of care by reviewing cases in which 
morbidity or mortality occurred.96 The committee was an early prototype of M & M conferences. 
They reviewed fatalities related to anesthesia and also aimed to enhance the education of 
physicians-in-training. Transparency also increased, with the commission releasing public 
reports and data. But the system was still relatively conservative in its review of errors. 
Reporting error remained voluntary, and often the physician responsible for the case was not 
present. Obvious and more egregious errors were not discussed.97  
Since then, the M & M conference has spread throughout different areas of medicine, 
including emergency medicine, surgery, and internal medicine. But the primary goal of these 
meetings has given way to almost an exclusive emphasis on education and teaching “interesting” 
cases.98  Staff surgeons and residents believe the primary goal of the conference is education, and 
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residents have asserted that the environment should be improved to decrease blame.99 In one 
study, only 72% of cases reviewed at weekly anesthesia M & M conferences included morbidity 
or mortality at all.100  Most cases were selected mainly for their teaching value.  
One might argue just because the focus has shifted to education, that does not necessarily 
mean that physicians do not analyze their errors. Components like admission of error, 
acknowledgement of responsibility, and commitment not to repeat similar errors could still exist 
in an educational environment.  But, in reality, errors are infrequently discussed. As low as 10% 
of cases presented in internal medicine conferences101 and 34% of cases in surgery conferences 
discussed error.102 Even more sobering, a study of surgical M & M conferences which were part 
of a formal quality assurance program revealed that physicians were often absent when their 
complications were discussed, with only 33% of the staff surgeons attending when their 
complications were discussed.103 Even when errors are discussed at the conferences, it is rare for 
participants to use language that indicated that an error had occurred.  Few acknowledged 
making the error at hand.104 Physicians reported that in about half of cases in which error was 
discussed, “the tough issues were not addressed.”105 In fact, most internal medicine conferences 
lack clear error-related objectives or established procedures for handling the discussion of 
errors.106 
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The reluctance to discuss errors publicly comes from many different sources. Physicians 
have cited the anxiety of exposing individual fault, reputational costs, fear of loss of referrals, 
and fears of liability and exposure to malpractice litigation.107  But one must question whether 
the legal liability of statements made during these conferences is a reasonable concern. Despite 
the perceived specter of liability in these forums, there are several evidentiary protections that 
are in place precisely to encourage physicians to speak out honestly and review their errors. The 
law affords multiple ways of preventing the information discussed in these conferences from 
getting to a jury. The two main sources are from the general federal rules of evidence, including 
the federal self-critical analysis, and the medical peer review privilege. 
First, in terms of the general federal rules of evidence, the categorical exclusion rule, 
Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, states that remedial action taken after an injury 
cannot be admitted as proof that the injury was a consequence of negligence.108 The underlying 
policy for the rule is to encourage defendants to improve the safety of their practices or product. 
Some states have extended the rule to cover self-evaluative reports and postinjury analyses, and 
the reports in M & M conferences can fall under this protection. However, the rule does not 
prevent the plaintiff from admitting the evidence for other purposes, such as proving causation or 
impeaching a witness. This may help explain physicians’ reluctance to speak, but at the same 
time, Rule 403 still gives the judge discretion to exclude evidence based on its prejudicial value. 
Given the strong underlying public policy of encouraging candor in the medical review process, 
the proceedings of M & M conferences have a high likelihood of being excluded from 
malpractice litigation either under Rule 407 or Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
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Moreover, courts have recognized immunity to discovery based on a federal self-critical 
analysis privilege. Under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a court can recognize 
privileges under “the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of 
the United States in the light of reason and experience.”109  In Jaffee v. Redmond, the Supreme 
Court held that Rule 501 authorized federal courts to define new privileges, but stressed that the 
evidentiary privileges should be construed narrowly and applied only where it “promotes 
sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence.”110 The court in 
Bredice v. Doctors Hospital, Inc., recognized a self-critical analysis privilege under Rule 501 for 
a hospital peer review conference on the treatment of patients, holding that the public’s interest is 
best served by encouraging candid discussions.111 This decision was affirmed in Weekoty, which 
held that the self-critical analysis privilege would be recognized in the context of proceedings 
and reports at morbidity and mortality conferences.112 The court stated that “[t]o open these 
meetings to public scrutiny would completely undermine the public good produced by ensuring 
confidentiality. ‘Constructive professional criticism cannot occur in an atmosphere of 
apprehension that one doctor’s suggestion will be used as a denunciation of a colleague’s 
conduct in a malpractice suit.’”113 The production of materials from M & M conferences and 
similar peer review mechanisms have been protected from discovery in other cases as well.114 
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Within the medical context, the self-critical analysis privilege has been rejected only in 
the context of claims by doctors against hospitals alleging racial or sexual discrimination,115 
defamation of character,116 or revocation of hospital privileges.117 While these opinions 
recognize that not all opinions held by physicians are protected by discovery, the underlying 
policy to safeguard proceedings and materials related to medical error in malpractice cases 
remains intact.118 
Finally, all states (except New Jersey) have statutes that protect the work of medical 
review committees or peer review committees.119 The stated policy goal of these laws is to 
encourage honesty and effective risk-management by physicians. These state laws differs both in 
terms of scope and strength by jurisdiction, but share two common purposes: 1) to provide 
immunity from liability for committee members participating in good faith in the peer review 
process; and 2) to protect the medical review committee, and its records and materials from 
discovery in civil actions.120 These laws were enacted to encourage effective medical peer 
review. 
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The Washington Supreme Court articulated a test for determining whether the privilege 
was recognized and applied the privilege only where the committee in question was a “regularly 
constituted committee or board of the hospital whose duty it is to review and evaluate the quality 
of patient care.”121  Since courts generally realize that the privilege exists to encourage effective 
medical peer review, morbidity and mortality conferences usually qualify as “medical review 
committees” as defined with the statutes.122 A minority of courts, like the Georgia Supreme 
Court, have read the statutory privilege more narrowly, strictly limiting the privilege to only 
committees specified by the statute.123 The court held that the statute did not protect information 
generated by or kept by groups other than the specified “medical review committee” under the 
statute. However, in Poulnott, the Georgia appellate court held that a surgical conference fell 
within the definition of a medical review committee, despite the fact that there was no set 
membership, since it was considered an initial step in the peer-review process.124 Therefore, even 
in jurisdictions that strictly construe the scope of the statute, the conferences can be structured to 
conform to the formal requirements of a medical review committee in order to show that these 
conferences are steps toward a peer-review process. 
This brings us back to the earlier point that modern M & M conferences have strayed 
from their original purpose of overseeing error and quality control. The paradox is that the less 
likely physicians are willing to format such conferences as places for discussion of error and 
quality of patient care, the less likely courts will be willing to extend medical peer review 
privilege to them. In other words, if physicians are worried that what they say at M & M 
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conferences might not be protected, their behavior to steer these conferences clear of error 
discussion will ultimately lead to less protection for these conferences, creating a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. Instead, these conferences are in fact strongly protected by the law as long as address 
and discuss error and seek to improve the quality of care. 
But the strong legal protection of proceedings at M & M conferences does not necessarily 
mean that they provide the best setting for error discussion. The resistance to disclosure among 
physicians suggests that there other sources for physicians’ silence. As mentioned before, the 
social, nonlegal pressures of the M & M conference are considerable. Physicians-in-training have 
reported that mistakes were discussed at attending rounds in 57% of cases and at morning report 
or morbidity and mortality conferences in only 31% of cases.125 The latter category has a much 
broader, larger audience compared to attending rounds. Attending rounds are generally 
comprised of the immediate medical team that is intimately involved in the patient care and 
usually includes only one treating attending physician. In contrast, morning reports include most 
physicians-in-training (i.e., chief residents, senior residents, and interns). M & M conferences 
include even more people: dozens of attending physicians, nearly all residents, and also medical 
students. 
Most of these physicians at either morning report or M & M conferences are not familiar 
to the patient case that is being presented and are not directly responsible for the patient’s care. 
When the physician-in-training on the team (usually mid-level or senior resident) presents the 
cases at the M & M conferences, she faces both a potential loss of respect not only from those 
higher up but also faces potentially undermining her authority over interns and medical students. 
The loss of respect not only translates into weakening her professional relationships, but also 
puts at risk her future performance assessment and recommendations from her seniors. 
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Furthermore, she may be unable to explain fully her error within the context of a complicated 
patient case in such a broad, public forum, most of whom are not familiar with the case history. 
One might expect that the doctors who are more senior are more secure and thus more 
willing to discuss error. While this  might be the case, even those at the top of the hierarchy risk 
the economic loss of future referrals by their fellow colleagues and loss of respect. Worse still, 
even when high-ranking physicians do admit error, the M & M conference may not provide an 
effective self-checking mechanism. Dr. Atul Gawande points this out, in his account of an 
orthopedic surgeon who repeatedly demonstrated poor decision-making and patient care. 
Physician colleagues did not prevent him from continuing to operate.126 Dr. Sherwin Nuland, 
also a surgeon, goes even further and writes that that M & M conferences “support our tendency 
to excuse ourselves for looking the other way. At such meetings various commentators are 
certain to bring up what in the confines of a conference room would appear to be the perfect 
apology, namely, that ‘the patient’s disease was the culprit.’”127 
Charles Bosk notes that one strong prohibition against criticism among physicians at the 
M & M conference is the professional norm that the patient is the individual responsibility of the 
supervising attending physician.128 In other words, it would be disrespectful for an attending 
physician to criticize another attending physician or members of her team regarding how they 
handled their patient.129 This unspoken professional rule makes self-regulation even less 
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effective. Physicians who make obvious errors may go unchecked by other physicians. It is 
considered unprofessional and unfathomable if a physician discloses to the patient that another 
physician may have committed an error, no matter how obvious the error might be. This tradition 
is deeply entrenched in the history of the medical profession and its tendency to protect its own. 
In the early twentieth century, when professional medical societies were at their height of 
control, it was nearly impossible to find a physician willing to be an expert witness for the 
plaintiff.130 This is no longer the case today as the power of the professional societies has faded, 
but the underlying sentiment of self-protective behavior of physicians is still strong. 
The social norms of medicine and physicians may prevent physicians from criticizing 
each other either publicly or from attending to attending. But physicians also do not always 
report and discuss errors even on their own team. In a recent study, only 54% of physicians-in-
training reported that they discussed the mistake with the supervising attending physician of the 
patient.131 Although this is higher than reporting in M & M conferences (31%), it is still little 
over half of the time. A substantial percentage of mistakes go thus unreported to the supervising 
physician. One might try to give physicians the benefit of the doubt—perhaps physicians did not 
find it necessary to report the mistakes because the mistakes did not actually harm the patient. 
But 90% of the physicians in the same study reported that the mistakes actually had “significant 
adverse outcomes” for the patient.132  What could then explain the decision to keep such harmful 
mistakes concealed from the supervising physician? 
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One explanation is the natural discomfort of drawing attention to your own weaknesses 
and mistakes, particularly to an authority figure who is evaluating your performance. In the same 
study, 88% of physicians-in-training discussed the mistake with another physician who was not 
in a supervisory capacity and 58% spoke with a non-medical person about the mistake.133 This 
dispels the notion that physicians are simply silent about their own mistakes to everyone. On the 
contrary, physicians feel a strong need to communicate and confess the mistake to someone. A 
strikingly low 5% of physicians did not tell anyone about the mistake.134 
But while the fear of a poor evaluation and the hierarchical nature of medicine contribute 
to the unwillingness to admit error openly among colleagues, this alone does not explain fully 
why physicians are unable to discuss such errors. Physicians-in-training actually do not 
demonstrate a strong fear of negative consequences: Only 28% of physicians reported a fear of 
negative repercussions to themselves from these mistakes. So if they are not worried about 
negative consequences for themselves, what else is stopping them from telling their supervising 
physicians? 
The examples of the M & M conference and discussion with supervising physicians 
demonstrate that the fear of liability or damage to reputation is not an adequate or satisfying 
explanation for why physicians are reluctant to discuss and admit to errors in patient care even 
among themselves. The discomfort of public accountability may not be the only reason doctors 
remain silent about errors. But if physicians are unable to admit error among their own 
                                                 
133 Id. 
134 Id. It is possible that the percentage of physicians who do not tell anyone about their mistake is greater, since 
there are limitations to the research survey that could weaken this conclusion. In particular, it is possible that the 
nonresponse to the survey was nonrandom. In other words, those who responded to the survey on medical mistakes 
may also be the type of physicians who are able to share their mistakes in the first place. Those who remain in denial 
or refuse to share the information could be more likely to decline to return the survey (45% of the 254 physicians 
surveyed responded). 
34 
colleagues and under legal protection, it comes as little surprise that physicians rarely admit or 
disclose errors to the public or to their patients, to whom they are perhaps the most accountable. 
B. Disclosure to Reporting Systems 
What is most striking is that even nonpunitive measures suffer from underreporting. 
Reporting systems at the federal and state level attempt to build a database upon which providers 
can patient safety.135 The detection and prevention of medical error continues to be plagued by 
underreporting of adverse events, even when they are anonymous, voluntary and confidential.136 
This is in marked contrast with the reporting systems that have successfully monitored other 
kinds of events, like adverse drug reactions, vaccine reactions, or nosocomial infections.137 This 
suggests that there is something particular about the nature of medical errors that physicians are 
uncomfortable with reporting, even when they will not be held accountable. 
The most recent effort to encourage reporting is the Patient Safety and Improvement Act 
of 2005.138 Providers can contract with Patient Safety Organizations (PSOs), new public or 
private entities created by this Act that would identify and analyze patient safety issues. The 
work product between the provider and PSO is both confidential and privileged.139 PSOs will not 
be federally funded, however: providers are expected to fund PSOs. It is too soon to know 
whether these PSO systems will also suffer from underreporting as the other reporting systems 
before it. But there is little to suggest that these systems will be any more successful in inducing 
physicians to report errors. 
IV. Why physicians resist disclosure 
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Part IV explores what creates this strong, pervasive resistance by physicians to speak 
about medical errors. The previous sections have illustrated that physicians are reluctant to report 
and speak about errors, even when they are provided with legal protections. This suggests that 
accountability and legal liability are incomplete answers. But these concerns about legal liability 
are frequently cited as major contributors to why physicians do not disclose their medical errors, 
particularly to patients. Other common reasons are disciplinary action, damage to one’s 
reputation within the public or medical community all weigh against the decision to disclose.140 
This Part examines these concerns one by one. 
A. The Risk of Malpractice Litigation 
In the aftermath of adverse events, many physicians claim that they are concerned about 
the risk of malpractice litigation. It is an answer commonly used by those with defense interests. 
The Institute of Medicine claims that “[p]atient safety is . . . hindered through the liability system 
and the threat of malpractice, which discourages the disclosure of errors.”141 Troyen Brennan and 
Philip Howard also assert that health care errors go unreported because “people fearful of legal 
consequences are reluctant to speak up.”142 
The AMA Code of Ethics clearly forbids physicians from considering legal liability when 
during disclosure.143 But the fear of malpractice litigation is pervasive and potent.144 Physicians 
see the tort system as an irrational “lawsuit lottery” and “revile malpractice claims as random 
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events that visit unwarranted expense and emotional pain on competent, hardworking 
practitioners.”145 But physicians overestimate the certainty and severity of legal sanctions, and 
the actual risk of getting sued by threefold.146 Studies suggest that physicians believe erroneously 
that most negligent adverse events lead to lawsuits, estimating that 60% of cases involving 
negligence result in litigation, which is thirty times higher than most estimates.147 
The reasons behind this overestimation may be linked to a misunderstanding of the legal 
system, including a failure to consider practical barriers to filing lawsuits (e.g. accessibility to 
lawyers, willingness for plaintiff lawyers to take on malpractice suits) or an overestimation of 
patients’ litigiousness. Faced with a rising frequency of claims, seemingly more aggressive 
clients, and spikes in insurance premiums, doctors and hospitals blame the trial bar.148 Others 
have blamed these inflated fears as a result of predictable guild behavior stemming from “self-
interest” or “the influence of organized medicine.”149 Such interpretations are at risk for 
oversimplification and do not analyze the many distortions inherent to risk perception in general. 
Also, to reduce the problem to merely misinformation or miscalculation in statistical 
probabilities ignores the effect of psychological aspects on risk perception. 
Risk perceptions are generated by both feelings and cognitive variables, like probabilities 
and outcomes.150 Risk perception literature illuminates how the fear of legal liability is linked to 
multiples sources. Hazards that are more dramatic are more easily remembered and have high 
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cognitive “availability,” leading to overestimation of risk.151 Well-publicized effects on 
malpractice premiums and large malpractice jury awards impress upon physicians the drama and 
horror of malpractice lawsuits.152 
Risk perceptions are highest if an adverse event causes “dread risk”—events associated 
with a lack of control, dread, catastrophic potential, fatal consequences, or an unjust distribution 
of risks and benefits.153  Malpractice suits contain all of these elements, except for fatal 
consequences. Physicians are distressed by the lack of control during a lawsuit.154 The lawsuit 
makes physicians feel “uneasy, vulnerable, dependent, frustrated.”155 Malpractice cases strike a 
heavy blow and threaten their careers and reputation, both of which most physicians have 
invested in and prepared for meticulously for years. Physicians feel angry and insulted by 
lawsuits—perceiving them as a challenge to their authority and their integrity. 
Physicians dread the monetary costs, damage to professional reputation, risk to licensure 
and the emotional burdens that come with lawsuits. Individuals base risk assessment on 
subjective factors, like the similarity of their own situation to those whom they have personal 
knowledge.156 Physicians therefore identify with the experience of their colleagues. A majority 
of physicians know at least one colleague who has gone through an emotionally and 
                                                 
151 Asabo Holm, Comparative Studies of Risk Perception: A Review of Twenty Years of Research, 1 J. RISK RES. 
135, 138 (1998) (citing work of Lichtenstein et al.). 
152 Id. at 475. 
153 Id. 
154 The difficult experience of malpractice litigation on physician has prompted works to coach physicians. See e.g., 
SARA C. CHARLES & PAUL R. FRISCH, ADVERSE EVENTS, STRESS AND LITIGATION. A PHYSICIAN’S GUIDE (2005). 
Charles & Frisch focus on how physicians can help themselves by “regaining control.” Id. at 126-27. 
155 Id. at 126. 
156 Id. at 473 (citing risk assessment literature). 
38 
professionally trying malpractice lawsuit.157 A substantial number of physicians who are sued 
speak about the negative experience with their peers.158 
Physicians have reason to dread lawsuits. Lawsuits provoke marked distress in most 
physicians. Over 95% of physicians report strong emotional responses, physical reactions, or 
both.159 A majority of physicians who have been sued report depressed mood (72-80%), inner 
conflict (74-86%), frustration (70-78%), and anger (70-88%).160 Half of physicians report 
insomnia and a minority describe an onset or exacerbation of physical problems that they 
attribute to the lawsuit. These emotions were not relieved, even if the physician won the case. 
The psychological and physical reactions to malpractice lawsuits are tied to the allegations, not 
necessarily the outcome of the case.161 The allegation, legal process, and outcome are all 
stressful to physicians. Physicians must face burdens of questioning themselves and being 
questioned by others, and grapple with the stigma of implied failure of due care. Being cleared of 
the charge does little to lift those burdens. In fact, physicians who have successfully defended 
their case may still go on to change their clinical decisions, including ordering unnecessary tests, 
changing record keeping, avoiding high-risk procedures or certain patients, and even choosing 
early retirement.162 
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Many physicians also believe that the tort system is not a just distribution of benefits and 
costs. They believe that they will be sued for non-negligent adverse events.163 In fact, research 
published in the New England Journal of Medicine feeds this idea; researchers found that the 
severity of the patient’s disability, not the presence of negligence, was more predictive of 
payment to plaintiff. This result was interpreted to suggest an unjust torts system, even though 
there are alternative explanations.164 Finally, events that occur in a poorly understood system 
further amplify risk perception. In most cases, physicians are unfamiliar with the legal system—
and particularly an adversarial system. Given this backdrop, the decision to disclose and 
therefore possibly expose oneself to a lawsuit runs against basic fears of exposing oneself to 
harm—whether professional, emotional or physical.  
But the problem is deeper than the fact that physicians dislike the unpredictability of the 
malpractice system.  Doctors are not just afraid of being sued for errors that they may not have 
committed. But physicians also resent being sued for errors that they did in fact make.165 The 
fear litigation includes a fear of retribution. Physicians recognize that patients and families 
demand accountability. One New England Journal of Medicine study concluded that “[t]he 
public believes that persons responsible for errors with serious consequences should be sued, 
fined, and subject to suspension of their professional license.”166 
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Most patients and families who file a legal action report feeling angry, bitter, betrayed, or 
humiliated.167 In cases where explanations were given, patients and family report feeling 
dissatisfied—that the explanation was unclear, inaccurate, or sparse—even though 40% felt like 
the explanations were given sympathetically. Most were informed of the error by hospital 
administration in 70% of cases, and by the doctor in less than 10% of cases.168 This leaves one to 
wonder whether a doctor’s direct acknowledgment and explanation of the error would have 
changed the patient’s willingness to sue. But even more importantly, this data suggests that an 
empathetic discussion is insufficient to deter a lawsuit, undermining a major presumption of 
apology laws that apologies can lead to lower lawsuits. 
The most prominent reasons that patients and families filed a lawsuit was because they 
did not want the mistake to happen to anyone else, wanted an explanation, or wanted the doctor 
to realize what they had done or to admit negligence.169 Many wanted the doctor to know how 
they felt, felt ignored, and wanted financial compensation. Patients also report feelings of 
revenge and desire for punitive measures. One study found that two-thirds of patients in general 
want the responsible physician to be reprimanded by an authority and almost half wanted the 
doctor to be punished, including that the physician be put on probation or to have their license 
suspended or revoked.170 Indeed, a substantial number of patients who filed lawsuits reported 
that they wanted of revenge and disciplinary action against their physician.171 In general, a poor 
                                                 
167 Charles Vincent et al., Why do people sue doctors? A study of patients and relatives taking legal action, 343 The 
Lancet 1609, 1611 (1994) (finding 90% of those seeking legal action were angry, 80% bitter, 55% betrayed, and 
40% feeling humiliated). Families who filed medical malpractice claims after perinatal injuries reported a range of 
reasons: 33% of cases were advised by acquaintances, 24% felt like there was a cover-up; 24% needed financial 
help, 23% felt their child had no future, 20% wanted information, and 19% felt they wanted to seek revenge or 
protect others from harm. Gerald B. Hickson et al., Factors that Prompted Families to File Medical Malpractice 
Claims Following Perinatal Injuries, 267 J. Am. Med. Assoc 1359 (1992). 
168 Id. at 1611. 
169 Id. at 1611. 
170 Mazor et al., supra note 64. 
171 Vincent et al., supra note 167, at 1611. 
41 
physician-patient relationship can be a major contributor to why patients seek suit.172 Plaintiffs 
report that their physicians did not listen, would not speak openly, or was misleading or did not 
adequately warn the patient of the risks.173 People also report that they sued because they felt that 
the physician was not honest, were unable to find out information about the incident, or that a 
non-lawyer third party recommended a lawsuit.174 Although these studies suggest that disclosure 
might actually lower the number of claims, all studies in this area are conducted retrospectively 
and are thus subject to hindsight bias. There is no reassurance that even if things had been done 
differently, that patients would have actually forgone a lawsuit. 
To make matters worse, the impact of full disclosure may only buffer a difficult situation 
after a severe mistake. There has been no clear empirical study in this area. The relationship 
between full disclosure and a patient’s desire to sue remains unclear: disclosure has been shown 
to increase, decrease, or not change at all the patient’s desire to sue.175 Given the lack of a 
consensus, many physicians remain skeptical of the ability for disclosure to stop a patient from 
legal action:  “Despite anecdotal reports of such positive experiences, the notion that disclosure 
reduces litigation is largely unproven and somewhat implausible.”176 
Advocates of full disclosure and apology laws frequently tout the Veterans Affairs 
medical center experience in Lexington, Kentucky as an example where full disclosure led to 
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overall lower legal costs.177 In 1987, the Lexington center instituted a new policy of mandatory 
disclosure. They notified patients of negligence, scheduled a face-to-face meeting of a group of 
administrators with the patient and family, and assisted patients in filing claims. The medical 
center settled most of their claims and was in the top quarter of VA medical centers for number 
of tort claims filed but was in the lowest quarter for malpractice payouts. But the administrators 
of Lexington center were hesitant to compare this number with other health care facilities, given 
their limited access to factors like workload, inpatient days, size and complexity of facility, types 
of procedures and regional differences—all of which can affect the patient’s willingness to 
sue.178 Nevertheless, in 2005, the disclosure policy was extended to all Veterans Affairs medical 
centers.179 
What is strikingly absent or glossed over when advocates of disclosure use the Lexington 
VA as an example of a full disclosure policy are the major differences in the way the law treats 
Veterans Affairs (VA) hospitals compared to nongovernmental hospitals. First, the VA system is 
a government-based system that offers comprehensive, nearly free universal coverage. The 
system has the ability to compensate those who have suffered an adverse event through remedial 
treatment or even disability payments without going through a lawsuit.180 In contrast, 
compensation for patients in nongovernmental hospitals is sought through more limited means: 
Some patients can seek compensation through direct negotiations between a patient’s 
representative and hospital lawyers but usually only if there is obvious error. If there is no 
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obvious case of error, the plaintiff must file a lawsuit in order to seek compensation.181 Second, 
government health care practitioners are immune from personal liability as government 
employees under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).182 Under the FTCA, the court applies the 
tort standards of the state where the incident occurred for its substantive law. 183  But before a 
claim can be filed in federal court, the claimant must file an administrative demand against the 
government and must exhaust administrative remedies.  The administrative claim requirement 
gives the government the opportunity to settle the claim outside of court and to provide the 
claimants with a way to resolve small claims that would not be cost-effective to litigate.184 Thus, 
physicians at VA hospitals benefit from much stronger barriers to lawsuits and more options 
outside of litigation. At a more basic level, the patient population at VA hospitals is also skewed 
compared to nongovernmental hospitals. A predominantly male patient population means that 
most facilities do not usually include obstetrics—one of the most frequently named specialities 
in malpractice cases.185 The VA system and doctors are better situated to deal with the 
potentially costly consequences of a full disclosure policy. Such differences make the Lexington 
center disanalogous to nongovernmental hospitals and physicians. 
Few nongovernmental hospitals, in fact, have a disclosure policy in place.186 But some 
have implemented a disclosure policy. Studies of these hospitals should be conducted in order to 
determine the costs and benefits to hospitals. Dana Farber Cancer Institute in Boston reports that 
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their policy to disclose has not resulted in a dramatic increase in lawsuits, and another hospital in 
Massachusetts, Sturdy Memorial, reports that disclosure has been positive for the hospital 
overall. But hospitals are split on whether patients are less likely to sue after disclosure, 
reflecting the similar ambivalence of physicians toward disclosure’s impact on litigation.187 
The fear of liability is an unsatisfying answer to why physicians choose not to disclose. 
Some physicians have admitted that there is no empirical basis for this assertion: “[n]o link 
between [error] reporting and litigation has ever been demonstrated.”188 Critics like David 
Hyman and Charles Silver dispute the fact that the fear of liability is a major contributor to 
nondisclosure. They contend that “there is massive underreporting of errors throughout the 
health care system, regardless of the level of liability risk that providers face.”189 Hyman and 
Silver point out those physicians at VA hospitals, who are not individually liable, have not 
historically disclosed more often than physicians at nongovernmental hospitals.190 Specialties 
with varying levels of liability are also no different at reporting errors.191 This paper has also 
suggested that the real reason behind physician nondisclosure is not fully answered by legal 
liability, since forums that are more legally protected fare no better in encouraging doctors to 
disclose and even when reporting systems are nonpunitive. 
Will physicians be persuaded by this evidence or Hyman and Silver’s criticism? I believe 
not. Such criticisms will do little to persuade physicians to reflect on why they really choose not 
to disclose errors. As outsiders of a highly insulated profession, authors like Hyman and Silver 
and Tom Baker, author of The Myth of Medical Malpractice,192 will be accused of not really 
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understanding medicine. As one physician noted, Baker’s book was “clearly written by a law 
professor.”193 The same physician quickly followed with a story of how his friend, also a 
physician, suffered a traumatic experience in a malpractice suit. 
B. The Tradition of Self-Regulation 
The desire for self-regulation in medicine is a major reason why physicians continue to 
resist disclosure. The fear of legal liability is but one part of the broader tradition that physicians 
like to be in control when it comes to their profession. Physicians resent being told what to do or 
how to treat their patients, especially by nonphysicians. 
Medicine has a history of self-regulation. Physicians worked hard to create an 
impermeability of the medical community to critics from the outside. Through control of 
licensing and professional societies, the medical profession had successfully gained control of 
both credentialing and disciplining physicians during the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. The medical community had successfully insulated itself from outside judgment and 
criticism.194 Local medical societies protected their members, and disciplinary actions were very 
rarely filed against physicians. This period has been regarded by physicians as the “golden 
age.”195 
But the push for public accountability in the 1970s and 1980s challenged this model of 
local, informal professional self-regulation and opened up the medical community to 
unprecedented scrutiny.196 Physicians no longer dominated disciplinary boards. States expanded 
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the role of the layperson and scaled back the role of medical societies.197 The quality control and 
patient safety movement, spurred by the IOM report in 2000, was part of this larger trend which 
threatened medicine’s autonomy. The movement to bring medical errors into the public eye and 
the push for physicians to disclose medical mistakes heightened physicians’ fears not just of 
liability, but, more fundamentally, their fear of having their control taken away from them. Six 
years after the IOM report, physicians continue to acknowledge that the discussion of medical 
errors remains hidden from the public eye: “As most of you are well aware, discussion of 
medical errors is still largely behind closed doors.”198 Few physicians have advocated for this to 
change. 
C. The Mask of Infallibility 
The issue of error hits a raw nerve in medicine. It is a difficult reminder of the 
profession’s vulnerability, a reality that threatens both the public and medical community’s 
idealization of the physician as infallible. Dr. David Hilfiker explains that both patients and 
physicians perpetuate the expectation of physician perfection:  
We are not prepared for our mistakes, and we don’t know how to cope with them when 
they occur. Doctors are not alone in harboring expectations of perfection. Patients, too, 
expect doctors to be perfect. Perhaps patients have to consider their doctors less prone to 
error than other people: how else can a sick or injured person, already afraid, come to 
trust the doctor?199 
 
Physicians are expected to be perfectly competent, conscientious, and compassionate in 
all domains.200 The image of perfection, as Dr. Jay Katz emphasizes, facilitates the fantasy of 
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both the patient as healed and physician as healer.201 The yoke of perfection is both attributed 
and self-imposed. As a result, Dr. Hilfiker describes how mistakes end up underground: 
[P]erfection is a grand illusion, of course, a game of mirrors that everyone plays. Doctors 
hide their mistakes from patients, from other doctors, even from themselves. Open 
discussion of mistakes is banished from the consultation room, from the operating room, 
from physicians’ meetings . . .202 
 
This image of perfection reinforces and feeds two fundamental aspects of the physician-patient 
relationship: the physician’s position of authority and the physician as a source of certainty—
both of which are foundations for trust.203 The authority of the physician figure is deeply 
connected with the idea of both moral and clinical perfection, and rests in: 
a belief in the physician’s superior expertise and . . . some sort of trust that a physician 
will make use of such expertise beneficently, in consideration only or mostly of the 
patient’s welfare and/or autonomy and not for mere profit, or in consideration only or 
mostly, of the outcome of some peer panel’s evaluation in an HMO review procedure.204 
 
Physicians and patients rely on the reassurance of certainty in medicine—in their diagnostic tests 
and imaging, clinical skills, and treatment plans. Though unrealistic, such certainty provides 
stability and comfort to both sides. Physicians are not trained to develop a keen awareness of 
uncertainty, much less acknowledge it to patients, though much of training is learning to cope 
with uncertainty. Dr. Sherwin Nuland notes, “If it is true, as some say, that physicians are the 
least introspective or self-doubting of the learned professionals, the reason may be that they are 
convinced of their own good intentions and of their ability to make correct therapeutic 
choices.”205 
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An increased awareness of uncertainty may or may not be helpful to patients, physicians, 
or the physician-patient relationship.206 One could also imagine that a worrywart physician who 
is aware of risks and limitations of science could be more conscientious and realistic: “diligence 
and attention to the minutest details can save you.”207 A mutual acknowledgement of uncertainty 
could make for better communication, where both parties set reasonable expectations. It may 
also produce a more humble and humane physician. Gawande emphasizing that although true 
perfection may be unrealistic, it should remain the ideal: “[D]octors will sometimes falter, and it 
isn’t reasonable to ask that we achieve perfection. What is reasonable is to ask that we never 
cease to aim for it.” However, a constant awareness of uncertainty (and reminder of one’s 
fallibility) might paralyze the physician, for, such doubts are “anxiety-producing for all 
concerned.”208 Dr. Atul Gawande describes a surgeon who made a mistake that killed a patient: 
“[a]fterwards, he [the surgeon] could barely bring himself to operate. When he did operate, he 
became tentative and indecisive. The case affected his performance for months.”209 The 
physician must struggle with a delicate balance of authority and semblance of certainty in 
gaining a patient’s trust and trust in oneself, carefully avoiding either extreme of being either too 
prideful or lacking confidence altogether. 
D. Potential Loss of Trust 
Physicians worry that to admit error tips this balance, pierces the “mask of infallibility”210 
and undermines trust. Physicians are concerned about an increasingly fragmented delivery of 
medical service and shorter available visits with their patients. All this combined, they claim, 
makes it difficult to form strong relationships with their patients—relationships that may not be 
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resilient to disclosure of mistakes. While the constraints on the physician-patient relationship (or 
at least the physician perception of them) may be true,211 it is not clear that patients are as 
unforgiving as physicians fear. Physicians may be much harsher on themselves and project this 
expectation onto the patients. Would the disclosure of a mistake destroy the trust that is so 
necessary to a meaningful therapeutic connection between the doctor and patient? 
Some studies show that patients are indeed less willing to see the physician again after 
mistakes, regardless of disclosure.212 One survey demonstrated that patients’ desire for referrals 
to another physician grew as the severity of the mistakes increased.213 The physician-patient 
relationship most likely takes a toll from the very event of the mistake—and disclosure can only 
buffer that breakdown in trust. If willingness of seeing the physician again is a proxy for trust, 
the breakdown of trust after mistakes—regardless of disclosure or not— clearly drops as the 
severity of mistakes increases. If the physician disclosed the mistake, 69% of patient reported 
they would retain their physician after a minor mistake, 41% after a moderate mistake, and 7% 
after a severe mistake. Compare this with the scenario where the physician does not disclose the 
mistake: 13% of patients would return after a minor mistake, 8% after a moderate mistake, and 
3% after a severe mistake.214 This data suggests that a significant percentage of patients lose trust 
in their doctor after a mistake, but that doctors can at least repair some of the damage by 
disclosing minor or moderate mistakes. Severe mistakes are only slightly affected by 
disclosure—and trust may be irreparable at that point. 
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Other studies suggest that disclosure can actually increase patient satisfaction and trust.215 
One study has shown that full disclosure actually reduced the reported likelihood of changing 
physicians and increased patient satisfaction, trust, and positive emotional response.216 But one 
major limitation of these studies is that they are hypothetical; participants are often drawn from 
outpatient clinical settings with no criteria or indication that they have had any significant 
experience with the medical system.217 . Physicians may reasonably fear that patients are even 
less forgiving in reality—particularly when patients are ill—compared to what they might report 
on a survey study. Thus whether disclosure successfully buffers the erosion of trust is uncertain. 
As a result, physicians are faced with a paradox of self-defeat: In order to restore trust, 
physicians must reveal mistakes, events that may be viewed as a betrayal of trust. The physician-
patient relationship must first be put into jeopardy before it can be redeemed. And to remain 
silent betrays a patient’s trust even more. The process of disclosure to physicians is anxiety-
producing not only because it leaves them exposed to the patient’s distrust, but also because it 
exposes them to their own distrust of themselves. 
E. Guilt and Shame 
One major piece of this puzzle may be found in the immense amount of guilt in 
physicians who have committed mistakes. Assuming good faith, physicians, like other health 
care professionals, choose their profession because they want to help people, not harm them. 
Moral guilt occurs when one has contravened one’s conscience.218 Physicians experience strong 
feelings of guilt and similar oppressive emotions after mistakes. Dr. Gawande describes his 
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reaction after his own mistake: “I felt a sense of shame like a burning ulcer. . . . What I felt was 
shame: I was what was wrong.”219 Physicians-in-training report strong emotional reactions to 
their mistakes: 81% reported feelings of remorse after their mistakes, 79% felt angry at 
themselves, 72% experienced guilt, and 60% felt inadequate.220 Only about 10% of physicians 
reported that they didn’t let the mistake get to them, even fewer tried to move on as if nothing 
had happened, and only 5% tried to forget the mistake.221  
Guilt can show itself as remorse, obsession, rationalization, resentment, depression or 
anxiety.222 Shame is an emotion, a “powerful henchman”223 of guilt, which occurs when the 
individual fails her own self-ideal. Physicians who have committed mistakes face at least three 
potential sources of guilt or shame: 1) the mistake itself; 2) the breach of trust and expectations 
of the patient; and 3) keeping the mistake secret from the patient. The anxiety of guilt is 
heightened around people connected to the event, and thus people avoid people who may judge 
or remind them of their past wrong, which helps explain why physicians avoid patients after 
mistakes.224 In fact, even when disclosure occurs, most patients are informed by hospital 
administration or institutional actors like the chief-of-staff in as much as 70% of cases, with the 
doctor explaining the error in less than 10% of cases.225 
It is perhaps these uncomfortable emotions that compel physicians to share their mistakes 
with other physicians and non-medical people to whom they are not responsible. Few are able to 
keep the mistake wholly repressed and secret.226 It is not clear in which direction the cause and 
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effect of the guilt and lack of disclosure runs,227 but one can imagine that it is a vicious cycle; the 
guilt of hidden knowledge compounds the guilt of the mistake, making it all the more difficult to 
disclose. 
F. Physician as Only Healer 
In addition to guilt and the fear of imperfection, disclosure runs against the grain of a 
tradition of the physician as a healer exclusively. The vision of the physician as healer is 
grounded in a long-standing tradition in medicine of withholding bad news—whether it was 
negative prognoses, diagnoses, or risks of the procedure and treatment— and refusing to deliver 
such information to patients and families.228 In fact, the American Medical Association (AMA) 
Code of Medical Ethics in 1903 emphasized that the physicians must always be the purveyor of 
hope and wellness, stating that  
[t]he physician should be a minister of hope and comfort to the sick, since life may be 
lengthened or shortened not only by the acts but by the words and manner of the 
physician, whose solemn duty is to avoid all utterances and actions having a tendency to 
discourage and depress the patient.229 
 
The Code goes so far to advise physicians to delegate the duty of delivering bad news to persons 
other than the physician.230 
But delivering bad news in general and delivering news of an adverse event should be 
distinguished in kind and present different and separate obstacles. The problem of the adverse 
event can even more difficult than delivering bad news. Delivering bad news about a test result 
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or a diagnosis can upset the patient and family, but the physician is able to be a source of 
strength and support. In disclosing an adverse event, the physician presents herself instead in 
opposition to the patient or family’s interests. She can still be a source of support, but she 
delivers news of a breach of trust, and must admit that the medical system, or physicians as part 
of that system, has failed them. This is a much more difficult and negative role to play. Most 
physicians are not prepared for this role.231 
G. Asymmetry in the Physician-Patient Relationship 
 
Another underlying problem of the physician-patient relationship is its inherent 
imbalance of knowledge. Doctors are able to hide their mistakes because of the major gap in 
knowledge and expertise between physicians and patients. Patients are in most cases not 
medically knowledgeable and sometimes are even physically incapable of being aware of their 
circumstances. The very relationship between physician-patients of such asymmetry at some 
level enables the physician to keep silent, particularly when there is no obvious harm done. 
But the asymmetry goes beyond pure medical expertise and knowledge. The relationship 
is a one-way enterprise. The physician is the silent observer, the listener. The patients divulge 
problems, confess symptoms, and, in surgery, have their bodies opened and exposed. In many 
ways, the physician-patient relationship is like a one-way window: the most intimate details of 
the patient’s life and body are shared with the physician, but there is no expectation that the 
physician must share information about herself. In fact, physician self-disclosure, when a 
physician describes a personal experience, is both rare and controversial.232 Physician self-
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disclosure is considered an unprofessional boundary violation,233 criticized as “a misuse of the 
patient to satisfy ones’ own needs for comfort or sympathy.”234 
In disclosure, the physicians find that the tables are turned. The physician is now 
vulnerable and exposed. But, unlike the patient, the physician cannot confess235—or ask for 
absolution of her guilt from the only person who can grant it: 
[u]nable to admit our mistakes, we physicians are cut off from healing. We cannot ask for 
forgiveness, and we get none. We are thwarted, stunted, we do not grow.236 
 
In silence, physicians leave the strength of the physician-patient relationship untested —
as well as their own ethic unfulfilled. 
V. Strategies to Encourage Disclosure 
Apology laws will not overcome these barriers to disclosure. From the legal liability 
angle, apologies may not actually lower litigation costs or number of lawsuits, and in some cases, 
may actually alert more patients to file a claim. Therefore, physicians will not be reassured that 
an apology or full disclosure will avert a lawsuit. This uncertainty can only exacerbate the 
frustrations and fears of physicians have toward liability. 
Second, the true location of the physician’s fear of legal liability is not simply losing a 
lawsuit. Many physicians are upset by simply the allegation, even in cases where they recognize 
negligence did occur. Evidentiary protections like apology laws only tip the lawsuit slightly in 
the physician’s favor but do nothing to get rid of the underlying fear or discomfort that a patient 
will file a claim. 
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Third, the traditions of self-regulation and physicians’ distrust toward the law237 suggest 
that apology laws, as part of the legal system, will have little credibility with physicians. They 
will be approached with suspicion, indifference, or skepticism. It is unclear whether physicians 
will even be aware of apology laws at all. As a practical matter, most physicians spend 
significantly much more time worrying about their clinical decision-making and studies in 
medicine than updating themselves about recent developments in the law. 
Finally, many other deeply ingrained traditions in medicine have made the discussion of 
medical errors uncomfortable or foreign to physicians. Apology laws do nothing to change these 
norms and habits. As long as they are present, physicians will continue to remain as silent as 
before. 
A. Increasing Physician Confidence in the Law 
One strategy to combat the fear of liability is to increase physicians’ confidence in the 
civil justice system. Physicians may feel less threatened if malpractice cases are screened by 
medical experts rather than lay people. Three different reforms have been proposed to increase 
expert involvement: 1) certificate of merit requirements; 2) medical screening panels; and 3) 
specialized medical malpractice courts. 
Among these, commentators suggest that the most promising reform is the certificate of 
merit requirements.238 Plaintiffs are required to get an expert assessment of their claim early in 
the case, which must confirm that the case has a reasonable chance of showing negligence. So far 
17 states have passed certificate of merit requirements.239 The idea behind the system is to lower 
the number of weak claims by stopping lawyers from filing claims that do not have a reasonable 
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chance of winning. The certification requirement gives plaintiffs a chance to find out from an 
expert what went wrong in the case. Therefore, patients who are filing to find out information 
may drop the suit. 
The problem with these requirements is that they only affect lawyers who do not already 
use experts in cases. Most lawyers who specialize in medical malpractice already use experts to 
screen for cases. The requirement will only deter non-specialist lawyers and increase the initial 
cost of bringing suit. This means that the plaintiffs that may be most affected will not just be 
those attempting to bring claims without merit, but patients who cannot afford the now higher 
cost of bringing suit. In terms of whether these requirements will actually assuage physicians’ 
fears of legal liability is unproven. I believe that physicians will not be sufficiently comforted by 
these technical legal requirements for the same reasons that have not responded to legal 
protections in other forums. The ability for these requirements to encourage disclosure of 
medical mistakes is highly doubtful. 
The screening panels perform no better than certificate of merit requirements and may 
actually be more inefficient and costly for the system overall. Screening panels adds peer review 
to the medical malpractice system. Physicians participate on a panel that reviews medical 
malpractice claims and decide the merit of the claim.240 These panels may give physicians a 
sense of control over the situation, knowing that their peers are overseeing which claims survive. 
Screening panels can also enable patients who are looking for information to drop or settle their 
case without going through costly litigation. 
But in practice, these screening panels have only added another layer of bureaucracy, 
exacerbated the cost of litigation, and contributed to more delay. Of the 31 states that originally 
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implemented some form of a screening panel, only 19 have continued to use them.241  Other 
states found that the number of claims actually rose.242 Physicians will be marginally comforted 
by these results. In states where panels reviews only after claims are filed, the allegation of 
negligence will still frustrate physicians. It is unlikely these screening panels offer enough 
confidence in the legal system so that physicians will change their behaviors or attitudes toward 
disclosure. 
Finally, some have proposed specialized medical courts.243 Judges who sit on these courts 
would be selected for their expertise in medical malpractice cases and would also develop their 
knowledge over time. Proponents claim that specialized courts would make the process faster 
and outcomes more uniform. Physicians may feel better that they will be tried by a judge that is 
more familiar with medical malpractice cases, though the reassurance is likely again marginal. 
By the time that defendant doctors appear in court, they will have already endured frustrations 
and the emotional harms of allegation, discovery, or other parts of the suit.244 Also, these courts 
would come with significant costs. The cost to litigants would be higher. The smaller number of 
judges would be more vulnerable to rent-seeking by interest groups. Judges themselves might 
develop a more narrow philosophy of judging, since they are seeing only medical malpractice 
cases.245 These costs will likely outweigh the small comfort that these courts provide to 
physicians. 
These legal reforms share one fundamental assumption. They assume that increasing 
physicians’ confidence in the legal system will change the way that physicians behave. But this 
paper has tried to demonstrate that legal liability may contribute to the resistance to disclose, but 
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that this is not the full story. These reforms do not touch the internal professional norms and 
incentives to disclose or apologize. 
B. Hospital Policies of Disclosure, Mediation, and Communication 
Hospitals have tried to change risk management and compensation for patients in order to 
encourage disclosure. Some hospitals, like the national system of Veterans Affairs hospitals, 
have implemented policies that mandate disclosure and apologies.246 But I have already 
discussed how physicians at VA hospitals are treated very differently by the law, and these 
results should not be extended to nongovernmental hospitals. 
The most recent example of a change in policy is the release of the Harvard Hospitals 
consensus statement on disclosure in March 2006. This statement recommends that physicians to 
take four steps to communicate adverse events: 1) tell the patient and family what happened; 2) 
take responsibility; 3) apologize; and 4) explain what will be done to prevent future events. It is 
unclear how physicians of these hospitals will learn of the existence of this policy in the first 
place.247 It is even more uncertain, once they find out about it, whether it will change their 
attitudes or behaviors toward disclosure. The policy does not have an enforcement mechanism.248 
This policy, like other hospital policies, is a top-down approach that is unlikely to affect the 
underlying resistance to disclosure. 
Others have recommended that hospitals use mediation to resolve claims.249 They have 
also suggested a consult service of communication experts to support physicians.250 These 
                                                 
246 Department of Veterans Affairs, Disclosure of Adverse Events to Patients, VHA Directive 2005-049, October 27, 
2005, available at http://www1.va.gov/vhaethics/download/AEPolicy.pdf. 
247 As of May 2006, none of the interns or residents of these teaching hospitals that I talked to were aware of this 
new policy. 
248 Barnes et al., supra note 28. 
249 Liebman & Hyman, supra note 4, at 31-56 (discussing disclosure and apology policies in health care systems and 
recommending consult service for communication experts). 
250 Id. at 31-45 
59 
services would advise physicians on when and how to discuss errors with the patient.251 These 
services may be helpful and may facilitate those physicians who are willing to consult the 
service. But the underlying problem will still be in getting physicians to use these services. These 
remedies do not adequately identify or address the source of the problem. The problem is not 
merely that physicians don’t know how to say that they are sorry or that they don’t know how to 
discuss errors, although this may be contributing factor. Again, this paper suggests that the lack 
of disclosure is not that simple. 
C. Medical Education and Training 
 Another strategy to encourage disclosure and apologies is a bottom-up approach through 
medical education.252 There are few, if any, places in medical education or clinical training that 
acknowledge that medical errors occur. Medical schools and residency training do not typically 
train physicians to disclose errors to patients. There are also many questions under this approach 
that will be difficult to address. What should students and physicians-in-training learn about 
medical errors? Should they learn how to deliver apologies? Will these sessions require a 
tradeoff from learning clinical material? Will education on medical errors compel more 
physicians to disclose? The M & M conference shows us how physicians can speak about error 
for the sake of education in a way that still fails to acknowledge responsibility or admit the 
uncertainty in medicine. Furthermore, it is not clear that an education that directly teaches taking 
responsibility will in fact change the attitudes or behavior of physicians when they practice. 
Nevertheless, despite the difficulty in changing actual behavior, there may be symbolic 
importance and moral worth for medical schools to demonstrate their normative commitments, 
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encourage apologies as the virtuous thing to do, and to put increasing moral pressure against the 
silence that surrounds mistakes. 
It is important to note in closing that whether an education that focuses on training 
physicians to come to terms with their fallibility is one that will serve the doctor-patient 
relationship. It is possible that the kind of denial and anxieties that cause physicians to be 
reluctant to disclose errors actually serve its own functions. Ignoring the fact that mistakes will 
inevitably be made, that diagnoses will always be uncertain, or even avoiding disclosing a 
mistake to the patient may be defense mechanisms necessary to being a good doctor: they may 
give doctors the confidence they need to carry many of the emotional burdens and stresses of 
medicine. The inability to admit anything less than perfection—both to others and themselves—
may be a nature that is both functional and dysfunctional for good medical practice. This paper 
therefore does not argue that more medical education may actually be the right answer, since the 
tradeoffs to such a system are unknown. The norms in medicine may be the root of the problem 
of silence, but it is a different and separate question whether a change in norms or habits of 
physicians is in fact desirable—a question that should be considered further in subsequent 
analysis. 
